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INTRODUCTION

For decades, the major U.S. airlines have raised passenger fares through
coordinated fare-setting when their route networks overlap, according to the
U.S. Department of Justice. Through its review of company documents and
testimony, the Justice Department found that when major airlines have
overlapping route networks, they respond to rivals’ price changes across
multiple routes and thereby discourage competition from their rivals. 1 A
recent empirical study reached a similar conclusion: It found that fares have
increased for this reason on more than 1000 routes nationwide and even that
American and Delta, two airlines with substantial route overlaps, have come
close to cooperating perfectly on routes they both serve.2

*

Research Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, and
Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, respectively. The authors are
grateful to Cory Capps, Joe Harrington, Alex MacKay, Nate Miller, Steve Salop, Katja Seim,
and to participants in the American University Washington College of Law Business Law
Faculty Workshop and the Penn Law Review Antitrust Symposium. A revised version will
be published in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
1
In the early 1990s, the government found that when a rival reduced fares, an airline would
commonly match on that route and also on another route that was a more important route to
the airline that cut fares (e.g., a route with an end point at the discounter’s hub). Proposed
Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Airline Tariff Publ’g
Co., 59 Fed. Reg. 15,225 (March 31, 1994); Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive
Impact Statement, United States v. Airline Tariff Publ’g Co., 58 Fed. Reg. 3,971 (January
12, 1993). The Justice Department more recently alleged that the airlines continue to employ
such “cross-market initiatives” to deter discounting and prevent fare wars. Amended
Complaint, United States v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-01236-CKK, ¶ 43
(D.D.C. September 5, 2013). Multimarket contact is not the only coordination mechanism
that the airlines employ. See, e.g., Gaurab Aryal, Federico Ciliberto & Benjamin T. Leyden,
Public Communication and Collusion in the Airline Industry 6 (Becker Friedman Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2018-11, 2018) (finding evidence suggesting that legacy airlines use
public communication in quarterly earnings calls to coordinate on capacity levels).
2
Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit
Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry, 45 RAND J. ECON.
764, 765, 789 (2014) (analyzing data from 2007). See also William N. Evans & Ioannis N.
Kessides, Living by the "Golden Rule": Multimarket Contact in the U.S. Airline Industry,
109 Q. J. ECON. 341, 341–43 (1994) (finding a relationship between greater multimarket
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Airlines are not the only major industry in which the major firms reach
coordinated outcomes in oligopoly markets (i.e., markets in which a small
number of firms are significant rivals), leading to higher prices and other
harms to buyers.3 A recent empirical study found that the 2008 joint venture
between Miller and Coors allowed the major brewers to coordinate to reduce
competition between themselves, thereby increasing the price of beer by an
estimated 6 to 8 percent.4 They plausibly achieved the higher prices through
leader-follower pricing.5
One possible interpretation of the price increase is that the airlines and
brewers engaged in explicit price-fixing or market division—collusive
conduct that would violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act and would likely be
criminally prosecuted by the Department of Justice if uncovered. That
possibility would suggest that express cartels—those operating under explicit
agreements—often go undetected and undeterred, consistent with what
empirical studies have found.6 Another interpretation of such evidence,
which is also plausible and, we suspect, more likely, is that oligopoly conduct
can often lead to coordinated outcomes that restrict competition without firms
expressly colluding on an agreement that would violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.7 They might achieve those coordinated outcomes purposively,
contact and higher airline fares using data from the mid-1980s). Enhanced coordination
arising from a substantial increase in multimarket contact would be expected to raise airfares
by 2 to 5 percent on routes where such contact is already at a moderate level. Ciliberto &
Williams, supra note 2, at 785–86.
3
For other empirical examples, see infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. Our article
focuses on coordination among sellers and does not discuss coordination among buyers,
although many of the issues are parallel.
4
Nathan H. Miller & Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Effects of the
MillerCoors Joint Venture, 85 ECONOMETRICA 1763, 1763 (2017). These price increases are
over-and-above price changes that would have come about were the firms not coordinating,
in the sense we use the term in this article.
5
See Nathan H. Miller, Gloria Sheu & Matthew C. Weinberg, Oligopolistic Price Leadership
and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry 2–4 (Working Paper 2019), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239248 (showing that price leadership could lead to higher prices
in this industry and referencing Justice Department pleadings describing the largest brewer
as a price leader).
6
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Yanhao Wei, What Can the Duration of Discovered Cartels
Tell Us About the Duration of All Cartels? 127 ECON. J. 1977, 1978 (2017) (finding that a
cartel has a 17 percent chance annually of either collapsing or being discovered); Peter G.
Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 531, 535 (1991) (concluding that the Justice Department detects at most 13
to 17 percent of cartels annually). By one back-of-the envelope calculation, nearly 29 express
cartels are active in the United States at any one time, overcharging U.S. buyers by $8.7
billion annually. JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM 14 (2019).
7
Coordinated outcomes that did not arise from express collusion can occasionally be
addressed under Section 1 of the Sherman Act by challenging practices facilitating
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by identifying consensus terms of coordination and deterring cheating, or
arrive at those outcomes simply as a consequence of recognizing their
interdependence and anticipating the natural and predictable reactions of their
rivals to their price changes.
Whether arrived at purposively or not, these examples of coordinated
conduct suggest that the possibility of coordination among oligopolists is not
effectively prevented by the prospect of Sherman Act liability. 8 This theme
contrasts with suggestions by antitrust commentators and courts influenced
by the Chicago school: that oligopolies usually perform competitively absent
express collusion, and that express collusion itself is difficult and therefore
rare.9 As we describe below, the economics literature does not support those
Chicago claims.
In brief summary of economic concepts that we will explain more fully
below,10 we define coordinated oligopoly outcomes as price elevation11
arising from strategic conduct. We say that a firm acts strategically when in
setting prices, the firm takes into account how it expects that its rivals will
respond–as one would expect firms to do when those responses would be
strong and likely to matter to buyers.12 In short, when high prices persist
coordination that have been adopted by agreement among rivals. E.g., United States v.
Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 336-38 (1969) (finding that price verification on demand
stabilized prices); see also id. at 339-40 (Fortas, J., concurring) (concluding that the
information exchange limited price competition). Cf. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., No.
28228, 1977 WL 1474, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1977) (modifying consent decree to prevent
firms previously convicted of price-fixing from adopting various practices); Proposed
Modification of Existing Judgments, United States v. General Electric, 42 Fed. Reg. 17,004
(1977) (describing practices electrical equipment firms used to raise prices without express
negotiation, including standardized product definitions, published price books, and buyer
protection policies (meeting competition and most-favored-nations clauses)). One of us has
argued that the Federal Trade Commission should use competition rulemaking to prohibit
practices facilitating oligopoly coordination, including practices unilaterally adopted.
Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly
Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 207-19 (1993).
8
The most influential antitrust treatise of the mid-twentieth century took a similar view.
CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 110 (1959) (suggesting that the joint exercise of market power, exercised without
engaging in conduct violating the Sherman Act, characterizes “a considerable number” of
markets).
9
See infra Section II.
10
See infra Section I.B.
11
Alterations to non-price terms of competition that harm buyers would be treated
analogously. We focus on price for concreteness.
12
When both anticipated rival responses (“conjectural variations” in economic language)
and buyer reactions (“diversion ratios” in economic language) are substantial, these factors
will substantially affect the firm’s gain or loss of customers in response to its cutting or
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because firms are discouraged from cutting price by the anticipated responses
of their rivals, we term the outcome coordinated.13
We term the outcome coordinated regardless of how those anticipated
responses arise.14 Our point is the breadth of this category, not the creation of
new dichotomies, but we nevertheless distinguish two types of responses.
When firms act on the expectation that rivals will punish cheating on a
common understanding in order to sustain and implement that understanding,
we call the strategic conduct “purposive.”15 In other cases, the strategic
raising its price and therefore its incentive to do so. For textbook discussions of the
determination of equilibrium prices in oligopoly when firms have non-zero conjectural
variations, see F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 206-08 (3d ed. 1990); STEPHEN MARTIN, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION IN CONTEXT 75 (2008).
13
The non-coordinated benchmark for price is thus the price that would arise if firms behaved
non-strategically, i.e., in a static Nash equilibrium when firms choose price or output, a
widely used framework for antitrust and economic analysis. That framework is often in
practice identified with “unilateral” oligopoly conduct, which in turn is commonly taken to
be distinct from “coordinated” conduct. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 6, 7 (2010) [hereinafter, “2010 HMG”] (discussing
unilateral and coordinated effects separately).
14
Our definition is consistent with the way coordination has long been described in the
horizontal merger guidelines. The 2010 guidelines state: “Coordinated interaction involves
conduct by multiple firms that is profitable for each of them only as a result of the
accommodating reactions of the others.” 2010 HMG § 7, supra note 13. Similarly, the 1992
Guidelines state: “Coordinated interaction is comprised of actions by a group of firms that
are profitable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others.”
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.1
(1992).
15
We use the term “purposive” to convey an important distinction both among forms of
conduct and among ways of analyzing conduct, but we do not mean to suggest all possible
connotations of the term. We do not intend the term to be interpreted to incorporate all
conduct undertaken in anticipation of likely responses. For instance, if (as in economists’
Stackelberg equilibrium) a price leader commits to its price and others set their prices to
maximize their profits in reliance on that commitment, we would call the leader’s strategic
conduct non-purposive. But if the followers always match the leader’s price even when that
is not their best response based on costs and demand, because they expect the leader to punish
them if they do otherwise, we would call the leader’s conduct purposive. Purposive strategic
conduct is closer to “negotiating” or “scheming” or “rewarding and punishing” than to
naturally “reacting.” The distinction is also analogous to the distinction Thomas Schelling
makes between a “warning” and a “threat.” Both are communications aimed at shaping the
responses of others (which could be other nations, in international affairs). A warning
describes what would already (absent the communication) be the actor’s true and inherent
interest (akin to a natural and predictable, or non-purposive, response), while a threat
communicates a calculated commitment to a position not otherwise in the actor’s interest
(akin to conduct that would be purposive if carried out). THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 123-24 (1960). The term “purposive” may also mislead to the extent
it suggests that the distinction turns on the subjective intent of the decision-makers at the
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conduct is “non-purposive.” We use the latter term when firms respond to
one another’s price changes in a natural and predictable business way, rather
than as a part of a scheme or attempt to develop a consensus or deter pricecutting. As Donald Turner explained nearly six decades ago, a rational
oligopolist understands that its rivals will “inevitably react” when it cuts
prices “because otherwise the price cut will make a substantial inroad on their
sales.”16 That rivals will “inevitably react” can lead to coordinated outcomes
even when firms do not seek to develop a common understanding or punish
cheating. We view the distinction between purposive and non-purposive
conduct as suggestive and useful, but not as setting forth an analytically
watertight classification scheme.17 Indeed, these two forms of strategic
conduct can coexist,18 and there undoubtedly are gray areas.
The previously referenced studies of airlines and brewing found that firms
reached coordinated outcomes but did not seek to distinguish between
purposive and non-purposive conduct. Either type of strategic conduct could
result in price leadership (brewing) or be facilitated by greater multimarket
contact (airlines).19 It is nonetheless important for antitrust enforcement to be
firms. Intent evidence may aid in understanding and interpreting conduct, however. See infra
text at note 66 (providing hypothetical examples of documentary or testimonial evidence
relevant to classifying strategic conduct as purposive or non-purposive).
16
Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 665 (1962). If, for example, Turner
explains, “there are only three producers of equal size and a price cut by one doubles his
sales, the sales of each of his two competitors will be cut in half.” Id.
17
To illustrate the distinctions our framework makes using categories and concepts taken
from economic theory, suppose price is the decision variable. If the oligopolists adopt
Bertrand-Nash responses (conjectures of zero) in a one-time interaction, the outcome is our
non-coordination benchmark. If the firms have continuous and non-zero conjectures that are
not history-dependent, and prices exceed benchmark levels, the outcome is coordinated and
we would likely say achieved through non-purposive strategic behavior. If the firms’
strategies are discontinuous and history-dependent, as with punishment responses, the
outcome is coordinated and achieved through purposive conduct. In particular we would
apply that label to express collusion (e.g., an express agreement to raise price or allocate
markets or customers), which often involves such punishment responses.
18
See MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 41 (2006) (indicating
that a factor that makes coordination easier is likely to do so both when firms talk and when
they do not). More generally, purposive and non-purposive coordinated conduct will coexist
when an oligopoly supergame model leads to elevated prices while supposing that the
oligopolists revert to an outcome consistent with some non-purposive coordination (an
outcome that falls short of joint profit-maximization) in the event the coordinated outcome
from purposive conduct falls apart.
19
In discussing their results, though, the authors of these studies plausibly adopt purposive
conduct interpretations. The authors of the brewing study take a modeling perspective that
presumes purposive conduct. Miller, Sheu & Weinberg, supra note 5, at 2. The authors of
the airlines study interpret increased multimarket conduct as loosening incentive
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alert for risks both of purposive and of non-purposive strategic conduct.
Because so much recent antitrust discussion has focused on coordinated
outcomes arising from purposive conduct, distinguishing between the two
forms—even while recognizing that some strategic conduct is hard to
classify—is helpful in drawing proper attention to non-purposive
coordination, and, relatedly, in understanding why antitrust commentators
and courts influenced by the Chicago school wrongly dismiss the latter
possibility. Distinguishing the two types of strategic conduct also facilitates
a detailed economic analysis of the competitive effects of firm conduct, as
we illustrate below with respect to evaluating the coordinated effects of
horizontal mergers.
As has long been recognized, the difficulty of attacking express cartels
and the Sherman Act’s circumscribed coverage of other forms of
coordination20 gives horizontal merger enforcement an important
prophylactic role: It increases the importance of preventing changes in market
structure through horizontal merger that would make coordinated outcomes
more likely or more effective.21 The Clayton Act focuses on whether a
horizontal merger will harm competition, including by making coordination
more likely or more effective, regardless of whether the coordination would
independently violate the Sherman Act. For this reason, we look to merger
enforcement when discussing the implications of our analysis for antitrust.22

compatibility constraints on coordinated outcomes, Ciliberto & Williams, supra note 2, at
764, and discuss some of their results in terms of incentives to deviate from a coordinated
outcome. Id. at 769, 780.
20
The Sherman Act has been interpreted to insulate many coordinated outcomes from
antitrust liability. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir.
2015) (“Express collusion violates antitrust law; tacit collusion does not.”)
21
See 6 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶901b2 (4th ed. 2016)
(explaining that a “central objective of merger policy is to obstruct” the creation of
“oligopolistic market structures in which tacit coordination can occur”); 6 PHILLIP AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW See also ¶1432d5 (3d ed. 2010) (describing the
"containment" approach of addressing the oligopoly problem through prohibiting
concentrating mergers and facilitating practices). Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger
Policy, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 45, 51-55 (2018) (justifying an incipiency test under the Clayton
Act based on the threat of post-merger coordination that would not violate the Sherman Act).
Cf. Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 1562, 1566 (1969) (indicating that the “extraordinary stringency” of the merger
guidelines that the Justice Department promulgated while Donald Turner was Assistant
Attorney General “may reflect in part Turner's earlier expressed view that once a market has
become highly concentrated there is little that can be done under existing law to prevent
noncompetitive, interdependent pricing”).
22
Our view of coordination is also relevant to a number of other important antitrust issues
we do not discuss, including identifying express collusion, inferring collusive agreements
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Although we explore a more detailed and nuanced economic analysis, one
important conclusion is straightforward: Whether through purposive or nonpurposive conduct, greater concentration can be expected to make
coordination more likely, stronger, or more effective. Accordingly, our
analysis supports a structural merger policy, by which mergers between rivals
that increase concentration significantly in a concentrated market are
presumed to harm competition.
In Section I of our article, we explain why coordinated conduct is a
serious concern. We explain in Section II why we disagree with the Chicago
views that such conduct is unlikely absent express collusion and that express
collusion itself is uncommon. Section III explains how our analysis of
coordination should apply to merger enforcement.
I. THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATED OLIGOPOLY CONDUCT
Modern economics offers many reasons to think that coordinated
outcomes may arise and persist in oligopoly markets. We begin with
empirical, experimental, and real-world evidence, then review the relevant
economic theory.
A. Empirical, Experimental, and Real-World Evidence
The relevant empirical literature extends beyond the previously discussed
studies of airlines and brewing.23 Studies have found that through strategic
conduct leading to coordinated outcomes, prices of cellular telephone series
increased by 7-10 percent and prices for hospital services offered by multihospital systems increased by 6-7 percent.24 In one urban retail gasoline
market, dominant firms engaged in price leadership to establish, after many
from circumstantial evidence, and analyzing the horizontal consequences of vertical mergers.
For analyses of economic issues raised by express collusion and its prosecution, see generally
JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., THE THEORY OF COLLUSION AND COMPETITION POLICY (2017);
ROBERT MARSHALL AND LESLIE MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND
BIDDING RINGS (2012).
23
See also Christopher John Sullivan, The Ice Cream Split: Empirically Distinguishing Price
and Product Space Collusion, in Three Essays on Product Collusion 36, at 65 (2017)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (finding that through coordination
over prices and product offerings of super-premium ice cream, Ben & Jerry’s and HäagenDazs raised average prices by 9 percent and 11 percent, respectively).
24
Meghan R. Busse, Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular Telephone
Industry, 9 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 287, 317 (2000); Matt Schmitt, Multimarket
Contact in the Hospital Industry, 10 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 361, 363 (2018). For both
industries, the studies found that coordinated outcomes were facilitated by multimarket
conduct, much as was found with airlines.

8

OLIGOPOLY COORDINATION

[19-May-2020

years of trying, coordinated prices as high as 15 percent above those that
would otherwise have prevailed without coordination.25
Empirical studies have also found that express cartels—one type of
purposive coordination—are durable. According to one study, the average
cartel lasted more than eight years, even though many cartels in the sample
were terminated by antitrust enforcement.26 Some cartels have survived more
than forty years.27 These results indicate that coordinated outcomes, once
attained, can readily be sustained.
Economists have identified a wide range of factors thought to facilitate
coordination. One typical list identifies several factors: a small number of
firms, simple or homogenous products, open and transparent transactions,
excess capacity in the hands of rivals, predictable demand, small and frequent
transactions, small buyers, inelastic market demand, low marginal costs
relative to price, and high customer switching costs.28 The experimental
economics literature supports many of these predictions—and in doing so
finds that coordinated outcomes are achieved and sustained in a range of
laboratory settings, though they are missed or fall apart in others.29

25

David P. Byrne & Nicolas de Roos, Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline,
109 AM. ECON. REV. 591, 600 (2018).
26
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Determinants
of Cartel Duration, 54 J. L. & ECON. 455, 463 (2011). See also Ari Hyytinen, Frode Steen &
Otto Toivanen, Cartels Uncovered, 10 AM. ECON. J. MICROECONOMICS 190, 210 (2018)
(finding that legal cartels in Finland had an average expected duration of 8.5 years);
Harrington & Wei, supra note 6, at 1998, 2002 (finding that cartels discovered by the Justice
Department, and thus terminated by antitrust enforcement, had an average duration of 5.8
years; adjusted for a statistical bias, the estimated average duration is between 5.3 and 6.8
years).
27
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 43, 53 tbl.2 (2006) (indicating that a number of cartels lasted at least 40
years).
28
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHAN B. BAKER & JOSHUA D. WRIGHT,
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION
POLICY 298-306 (3d ed. 2017) (setting forth factors facilitating or frustrating coordination
and explaining their rationales). While lists of factors facilitating coordination like these have
typically been created with purposive strategic conduct and the problem of inferring an
agreement among rivals from circumstantial evidence in mind, the same factors would often
also plausibly make non-purposive coordination more of a threat.
29
See generally Hans-Theo Normann and Wieland Muller, Experimental Economics in
Antitrust, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 229,
230-37 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, eds. 2014); Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens,
Oligopoly Experiments in the Current Millennium, 27 J. ECON. SURVEYS 439, 448-50 (2013);
Charles A. Holt, Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research, in HANDBOOK
OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 349, 398-416 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, eds. 1995).
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Experimental studies have found occasional coordinated outcomes in
“prisoners’ dilemma” experiments when firms interact in a single period or
for a fixed and certain number of periods.30 These are settings where
economic models suggest that rational actors would do otherwise. The
behavioral economics literature suggests that concerns for fairness and a
desire for vengeance may support coordination by inducing firms to punish
cheating even when that would not be a rational response. 31 A recent
experimental study lends some support. It finds that that coordination is more
stable when firms target specific rivals for punishment rather than when they
allow a coordinated consensus to break down, particularly when a large
number of firms coordinate—that is to say, when the incentives of any
individual firm to punish would be weak absent concerns for fairness. 32 In
addition, behavioral economists have raised the possibility that firms would
choose not to cheat on a coordinated consensus even when it would appear
rational do so if the coordinating firms can foster a sense of loyalty or esprit

Holt, supra note 29, at 402. In a prisoner’s dilemma, a common, simple, and well-known
way of modeling oligopoly interactions, all firms would profit if they can reach and sustain
a coordinated outcome. But each firm would find it even more profitable to cheat on that
outcome—if they knew that their rivals would not respond. In a single-period interaction, or
a repeated interaction over a known fixed period, standard theory would predict that the
temptation to cheat prevents successful coordination. Id. at 399 (explaining how the
prisoner’s dilemma game models the possibility of coordinated outcomes). See also William
J. Kolasky, Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful
Minds
and
Mavericks
6–7
(April
24,
2002),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11050.htm (same).
31
Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics and Antitrust, in 1 THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 206, 212–13 (Roger D. Blair & D.
Daniel
Sokol,
eds.
2014)
(noting
that
“vengeance induces more aggressive punishments for deviating”). For game theoretic work
on the possibility of collusion when firms predictably evade following through on threatened
punishments that harm the punisher, see Joseph Farrell & Eric Maskin, Renegotiation in
Repeated Games, 1 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAVIOR 327, 328 (1989) (noting that instead of
punishing the violator in ways that would hurt other participants, “it seems plausible that
[firms] will renegotiate back to mutual cooperation"); B. Douglas Bernheim & Debraj Ray,
Collective Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games, 1 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAVIOR 295,
296-97 (1989) (noting the possibility of firms renegotiating self-enforcing agreements);
Joseph Farrell, Renegotiation in Repeated Oligopoly Interaction, in INCENTIVES,
ORGANIZATION, AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 303, 306 (Peter J. Hammond & Gareth D. Myles,
eds. 2001) (in less concentrated markets, “full collusion (or anything close to it) is
inconsistent with what might seem a reasonable form of renegotiation-proofness.”).
32
Catherine Roux & Christian Thöni, Collusion Among Many Firms: The Disciplinary
Power of Targeted Punishment, 116 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 83, 91 (2015). A number
of prior experimental studies varying the number of market participants had found that tacit
collusion was often unsuccessful outside of duopoly. Id. at 83–84.
30
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de corps among themselves.33
Real-world evidence similarly confirms the plausibility of coordinated
oligopoly outcomes. Antitrust enforcers have found that express cartels with
five or six (or even ten or more) members are not uncommon.34 Business
schools routinely teach the adoption of practices that facilitate coordination
without risking antitrust liability.35
Coordination may not easily be recognized because coordinated
outcomes in real-world markets, while harmful, do not necessarily approach
the joint profit-maximizing outcome that a monopolist would achieve.
Empirical studies and the case law show that coordination can be incomplete
or imperfect in many ways and that coordinated outcomes may be
accompanied by conduct that is competitive in some respects.36 This should
not be surprising. Firms matching rivals’ price-cuts is, from one perspective,
quintessentially competitive behavior. But when firms anticipate that their
rivals will behave that way—either in a natural business way or as a response
to cheating—that expected reaction, which may seem competitive, can make
coordinated outcomes possible by discouraging price-cutting in the first
instance.
Even express cartels may not coordinate perfectly. The records of one
express cartel, the early 20th-century Sugar Institute, indicated that it would
allow occasional cheating to go unpunished.37 There are a number of other
examples of successful price-fixing or bid-rigging with some cheating.38
33

Armstrong & Huck, supra note 31 at 214.
Kolasky, supra note 30, at 17; Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What
Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 43, 59 tbl.4 (2006). See also John
William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers & Richard Lowery, Collusion in Brokered Markets
3–4 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 20-023, 2019) (explaining high real estate
commission rates in markets with large numbers of independent brokers in terms of a
supergame model of oligopoly conduct).
35
This has been common for at least four decades. Cf. MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE
STRATEGY 92-95 (1980) (encouraging firms to seek to improve all firms' positions by
employing active market signaling through announcements, selective advertising to
discipline recalcitrant rivals, and price leadership); id. at 106 (advocating standardization to
simplify industry prices and other decision variables so that oligopolists could establish an
advantageous focal point for their industry).
36
See infra at notes 37 to 43 and accompanying text.
37
David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative
Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 379, 393 (2001) (noting that,
although “wholesale cheating” was punished, “some cheating” was not, and collusion was
“(imperfectly) sustained”).
38
B. Douglas Bernheim & Erik Madsen, Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect
Cartels, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 387, 390-93 (2017) (describing cheating in various cartels,
34
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Moreover, some cartels collude on some but not all competitive dimensions.
British Airways and its co-conspirators colluded to set passenger fuel charges
on air travel between the United States and the United Kingdom but not on
the base air fare.39 Sotheby’s and its auction house co-conspirators colluded
to set the commission charged to sellers but not the commissions charged to
buyers.40
Imperfect coordination can also exist outside of express cartels.
Coordinated prices probably fell short of monopoly levels in the brewing,
airlines, cellular telephone, hospital, and urban gasoline industry examples
that were the subject of empirical studies we previously discussed.41
Empirical studies have also identified markets such as the 19th-century
railroad industry in which coordinated outcomes in some periods were
punctuated by occasional price wars in others42 as well as markets in which

including a lysine cartel, a food flavor-enhancing nucleotide cartel, a citric acid producers’
cartel, the Sugar Institute cartel, and the OPEC cartel).
39
The airlines also colluded to set cargo shipment rates on the same routes. Plea Agreement
at 3–6, United States v. British Airways PLC, No. 07-183-JDB (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2007)
(describing British Airways’s admission of guilt as to fixing the cargo rate as well as well as
the passenger fuel surcharge).
40
Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Sotheby’s Holdings Inc., No. 00-Cr-1081, 2000 WL
35630180 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2000).
41
In general, one would expect imperfect coordination to be more likely when oligopolists
coordinate by identifying a focal outcome, as through price leadership, rather than by
explicitly talking. Explicitly discussing terms of coordination would likely better reach the
joint profit-maximizing outcome but would also risk antitrust enforcement under Section 1
of the Sherman Act. See Baker, supra note 7 at 165 n.43 (explaining that “the feasible set of
coordinated equilibria ... that are consistent with a plausible focal rule ... need not contain
the joint profit-maximizing equilibrium”); Marshall & Marx, supra note 22, at 16 (arguing
that coordination without explicit communication tends to allow “[d]eviations induced by
self-interest profit maximization [to] creep into [firms’] conduct, and joint profits will fall
short of monopoly levels”).
42
See generally Glenn Ellison, Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive
Committee, 25 RAND J. ECON. 37 (1994) (studying the Joint Executive Committee, an 1880s
railroad cartel); Robert Porter, On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars, 33 J. INDUS.
ECON. 415 (1985) (same); Robert Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive
Committee, 1880-1886, 14 BELL J. ECON. 301 (1983) (same). This phenomenon has also
been observed in other industries. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel Policing
under Uncertainty: The U. S. Steel Industry, 1933-1939, 32 J. L. & ECON. S47, S67, S71
(1989) (finding that occasional price wars in response to unexpected declines in demand (i.e.,
marketplace punishments) supported coordination in the steel industry during the late
1930s); Timothy Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile
Industry: The 1955 Price War, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 427, 471–72 (1987) (finding evidence
suggesting that auto makers’ coordinated behavior was briefly interrupted by competitive
behavior before returning to coordination).
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coordination took place on some but not all competitive dimensions.43
B. Economic Theory
Economic theory looks at coordinated outcomes resulting from strategic
conduct in two general ways. In one perspective, oligopolists are seen as
collectively working towards a market outcome (for instance, a price level
and an allocation of market shares), constrained by the need to design or at
least identify intended responses to cheating on that outcome that are both
credible and sufficiently punitive to minimize the cheating concern.44
Oligopolists are usually viewed as focusing on sustainable (self-enforcing)
market outcomes that maximize profits, though that focus is not essential to
this perspective.
In the other perspective, oligopolists’ natural and predictable business
responses to one another’s price changes are the starting point, and a
coordinated outcome emerges organically from the interplay of those
responses.45 Substantial coordination can arise in such a framework, but there
is no expectation that the coordinated outcome would maximize anything.
When coordinated outcomes arise from purposive conduct, oligopolists
consciously or purposively put in place responses that discourage pricecutting because they collectively want the resulting high prices and are trying
to make them stick. This path to coordination involves some activity aimed
at reaching consensus on terms of coordination and enforcing that
consensus.46 This may involve determining the prices the firms will each
43

Frode Steen & Lars Sørgard, Disadvantageous Semicollusion: Price Competition in the
Norwegian Airline Industry (NHH Dept. of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 27/2012
2012), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2205825.
44
In technical language, economists taking this perspective model coordination as a choice
of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a repeated game. Often the focus is on outcomes that
maximize profits (or something else) among the subgame-perfect equilibria. For recent
examples of economic discussions of antitrust policy that view coordination through this
lens, see generally Robert H. Porter, Mergers and Coordinated Effects, INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.
(2020), available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102583; Marc Ivaldi, Bruno
Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright, & Jean Tirole, The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Final
Report for the Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission (IDEI, Working
Paper
No.
186,
2003),
available
at
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion
_en.pdf.
45
In technical terms, this approach calls on the ideas of conjectural variations.
46
Successful coordination also requires that the outcome not be entirely undermined by the
entry of new competitors or expansion by non-coordinating rivals. E.g., Levenstein and
Suslow, supra note 27, at 44 (noting that coordination is threatened by "entry (or expansion)
by non[-coordinating] firms.”) We assume throughout that coordinating firms are free from
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charge, the output they will each produce, or the customers they will each
serve. It may also involve clarifying how they will diagnose and punish
cheating. Simple economic models often assume that cheating on the
consensus by price-cutting will be punished by vigorous retaliatory price
cuts, though other punishment strategies are also possible.47 (We will
occasionally use the term “purposive coordination” as shorthand for
coordinated outcomes arising from purposive conduct.)
A prominent, though simplified, theoretical model of purposive oligopoly
conduct finds that even hundreds of rival firms interacting repeatedly can
sustain monopoly prices without creating net incentives to cheat.48
Coordinated outcomes often remain feasible even after adding to the model
complications like differences across firms in costs and product features,
uncertainty about demand, and slowed or limited punishment responses to
rival cheating.49 The theoretical literature also recognizes that coordinated
conduct could be limited to some but not all competitive dimensions.50
Purposive coordination includes but is broader than expressly collusive
conduct such as price-fixing and market division. Much discussion of “tacit
collusion” in antitrust commentary explores how firms might purposively
find their way toward a consensus plan and enforce it through price reactions
without necessarily engaging in conduct that would violate the Sherman
Act.51 By defining “coordinated” outcomes in economic terms, we include,
new competition or can deter it, at least to a degree that makes coordination among them
profitable and of concern.
47
When the major airlines went beyond matching rival fare cuts to reduce fares on routes
important to the rivals, see supra note 1 (discussing conduct by airlines subject to Justice
Department enforcement separately in the 1990s and the 2010s), they were plausibly
engaging in purposive conduct.
48
Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 329, 365–66 (Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, eds., 1989).
49
See, e.g., Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect
Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 89–94 (1984) (identifying the feasibility of
coordination in markets with uncertainty about demand).
50
See, e.g., Frode Steen & Lars Sørgard, Semicollusion, 5 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN
MICROECONOMICS 153, 165–66 (2009) (describing theory of coordination on one choice
variable (dimension of rivalry) while competing on others); David T. Levy & James D.
Reitzes, Basing Point Pricing and Incomplete Collusion, 33 J. REGIONAL SCIENCE 27, 29–
33 (1993) (same); Chaim Fershtman & Neil Gandal, Disadvantageous Semicollusion, 12
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 141, 152 (1994) (same).
51
Since the mid-1970s, under the influence of the Chicago approach to antitrust, the term
"tacit collusion" has come to mean no more than an agreement proved through circumstantial
evidence, Baker, supra note 7, at 145. As a matter of logic, however, an express agreement
(in which the parties provide each other with explicit assurances, usually verbal, that they
will carry out their promises) proved through circumstantial evidence is not the same as a

14

OLIGOPOLY COORDINATION

[19-May-2020

but do not limit the concept to, outcomes that result from “collusion”: a legal
term that usually carries the idea of an agreement,52 which is a predicate for
liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.53 Even when strategic conduct
is purposive, if consensus high prices are reached through leader-follower
pricing conduct, that outcome would probably not be deemed to have resulted
from an “agreement.”54 Coordinated outcomes arising from non-purposive
strategic conduct are even less likely to satisfy the agreement requirement of
Section 1.
When oligopolists respond to one another’s price changes in a natural
business way, they are engaged in non-purposive strategic conduct. Although
those reactions are not part of an express scheme or an informal effort to
develop a common understanding or deter price-cutting, those predictable
responses will generally affect oligopolists’ incentives and may well
discourage price-cutting. As the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines note,
coordination “includes situations in which each rival’s response to
competitive moves made by others is individually rational and not motivated
by retaliation or deterrence nor intended to sustain an agreed-upon market
outcome, but nevertheless emboldens price increases and weakens
competitive incentives to reduce prices or offer customers better terms.”55 We
call this type of strategic conduct “non-purposive” (and occasionally refer to
coordinated outcomes arising from such conduct as “non-purposive
coordination”). As was recognized by Donald Turner in the mid-twentieth
century,56 non-purposive coordination is likely to be common in oligopoly
and difficult to prohibit (i.e., difficult even for intelligent oligopolists to avoid
and difficult for judges to remedy).
tacit understanding (in which no such assurances are given). Id. at 145 n. 7.
52
Id. at 152 n.16. In our framework, express collusion can be understood as purposive
strategic behavior in which equilibrium selection involves conscious and explicit scheming,
most likely through talking. An “agreement” can be understood as a coordinated outcome
reached through what one of us has termed the “forbidden process” of negotiation and
exchange of assurances, rather than through the sort of leader-follower behavior that firms
cannot be expected to avoid and that courts cannot be expected to remedy. Id. at 179, 191.
53
15 U.S.C. §1. We follow the common practice of summarizing the “contract,
combination . . . , or conspiracy” language of the statute through the term “agreement.”
54
Richard Posner and Donald Turner famously debated whether “conscious parallelism,”
including leader-follower conduct, should be deemed an “agreement” under the Sherman
Act. See Gavil et al., supra note 28, at 320-24 (surveying the Turner-Posner debate). Turner’s
position—that it would be impractical for courts to interpret the Sherman Act to reach such
conduct, even when the economic consequences mirrored those of express collusion, because
the conduct is unavoidable and courts cannot be expected to devise viable remedies that
avoid chilling beneficial conduct—has largely prevailed. Id. at 322.
55
2010 HMG § 7, supra note 13.
56
Supra notes 16 & 54 and accompanying text.
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To motivate our view that coordination from non-purposive conduct is
common, we begin by observing that oligopolists typically monitor and
respond to rivals’ price changes.57 When one firm cuts its price and another
responds naturally, as we put it above, we have in mind that the second firm
is responding in a predictable way to an objective change in its business
environment. The second firm might naturally respond by cutting price, for
example, if it expects the first firm’s new price to persist; if the second firm
loses some of what it had been thinking of as reliable customers; or if it learns
from observing the price reduction that the first firm has lower costs or a
different business strategy than it had believed. These responses need not be
part of an effort to enforce a consensus on terms of coordination; they are just
what firms naturally and predictably do. Not surprisingly, the economics
literature has long recognized that objective sources of oligopoly dynamics
such as these can lead to coordinated outcomes.58
Prominent theoretical models of non-purposive oligopoly conduct
suggest the plausibility of coordinated outcomes. In one, firms match rivals’
competitive decisions before customers react (so-called “quick responses”).59
Edward Chamberlin’s simplified and informal quick response model, which
pointed out that oligopolists could have strong incentives to charge the
monopoly price,60 was influential in shaping the skepticism about oligopoly
that commonly characterized courts and commentators during antitrust’s

57

Such conduct is a common source of evidence in market definition, where it is a basis for
inferring what firms think about buyer substitution patterns. Jonathan B. Baker, Market
Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L. J. 129, 141 (2007).
58
See, e.g., Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly I: Overview and
Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs, 56 ECONOMETRICA 549, 553 (1988); E.H.C.
(Edward H. Chamberlin), Duopoly: Value Where Sellers are Few, 44 Q. J. ECON. 63, 65, 88
(1929). The economics literature has similarly identified oligopoly dynamics arising from
objective sources in other contexts. See generally Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Dynamic
Competition with Switching Costs, 19 RAND J. ECON. 123, (1988) (identifying switching
costs as the objective source); Alan Beggs & Paul Klemperer, Multi-Period Competition with
Switching Costs, 60 ECONOMETRICA 651 (1992) (same); Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 55 (1992) (identifying
network effects as the objective source).
59
Quick rival responses are plausibly understood as non-purposive reactions to the
immediate competitive environment, although they could also arise from purposive conduct.
See R. M. Anderson, Quick Response Equilibrium (Center for Research in Management,
University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper IP323, 1984, revised 1985; on file with
authors); V. Bhaskar, Quick Responses in Duopoly Ensure Monopoly Pricing, 29 ECON.
LETTERS 103 (1989).
60
E.H.C., supra note 58 at 86, 89. See generally EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 48 (1933) (describing the tendency to charge the monopoly
price.

16

OLIGOPOLY COORDINATION

[19-May-2020

structural era, which dated from the 1940s through the late 1970s).61
In another prominent model of non-purposive oligopoly conduct,62 each
firm chooses its price based on (reacting to) the price that its rival most
recently chose and that will briefly persist, but does not otherwise consider
how the firm’s rival behaved in the past.63 In this model, Eric Maskin and
Jean Tirole find that oligopolists will sustain high prices when each firm
correctly expects that if it cuts its price, its rival will cut price too. That
expectation dilutes the benefit from such discounting.64 Maskin and Tirole
analyze these simple price-cutting reactions as natural responses in the
competitive environment (hence non-purposive conduct), as distinct from
efforts to deter, reward, or punish rivals (which would be purposive conduct).
In their analysis, “cutting one's own price in response to another firm's price
cut is not carrying out a threat at all. It is merely an act of self-defense, an
attempt to regain lost customers.” Put by Maskin and Tirole in another way,
“the reaction is a response only to the other firm's price cut and not to earlier

61

During that period, the courts and antitrust enforcers were even hostile to small horizontal
mergers in markets that would be considered unconcentrated by today’s standards. E.g.,
United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 270 (1966). See 1968 Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,101 (showing antitrust enforcers’
hostility to horizontal mergers between firms with low shares in less concentrated markets).
62
Maskin & Tirole, supra note 58. In the model, the timing of adjustment costs creates short
term commitments, which affect rival reactions. See also Engelbert Dockner, A Dynamic
Theory of Conjectural Variations, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 377, 377 (1992) (exploring the
relationship between dynamic oligopolistic competition and static conjectural variations
equilibria in a model with adjustment costs); Luis Cabral, Conjectural Variations as a
Reduced Form, 49 ECON. LETTERS 397, 397-98 (1995) (identifying a dynamic game where
the conjectural variation solution is an exact reduced form). Cf. Zach Y. Brown & Alexander
MacKay, Competition in Pricing Algorithms 3 n.5, 5 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.
20-067, 2020) (finding that when firms compete by adopting simple pricing algorithms that
are linear in rivals’ prices, thus making short-run commitments, conjectural variation
equilibria can arise with prices that exceed those arising in static Nash equilibria when firms
choose price).
63
These firms employ “Markov strategies”: they base their decisions on the current state of
the world only. Bygones are bygones: Decisions do not depend on what rivals did in the past,
except insofar as those past actions objectively affect the current competitive environment.
Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole have explained that “Markov strategies seem at times to accord
better with the customary conception of a reaction in the informal industrial organization
literature than do, say, the reactions emphasized in the repeated game (or ‘supergame’)
tradition . . . .” Maskin & Tirole, supra note 58. at 553.
64
The firms do not necessarily expect their rivals also to match if they raise price. Such
asymmetric reactions are sometimes termed “kinked demand” strategies, although though
firm-specific demand curves in the models are not necessarily kinked: more elastic with
respect to price increases than with respect to price declines.
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history or to one's own past prices.”65
To help clarify the distinction between purposive and non-purposive
oligopoly conduct, suppose we have access to documents, emails, and
testimony from the firms in an oligopoly. If the evidence shows that
executives consider how rivals would respond when choosing key decision
variables like prices and output, that suggests that firm conduct is strategic,
without distinguishing between purposive and non-purposive conduct.
Suppose, further, that we can query the executives at one firm candidly about
what they think rivals would do were their firm to, for example, lower price,
and learn that they expect rivals to lower prices in response. If that
expectation discourages the first firm from cutting price in the first place,
keeping prices high, the outcome is coordinated.
Whether we would characterize the strategic conduct as purposive or nonpurposive depends in part on its rationale.66 If, for example, the executives,
still speaking candidly, expect rivals to match simply because they would
lose too many customers if they kept their price high, then the strategic
conduct may be non-purposive. If instead, for example, they expect rivals to
match because the rivals think that doing so will make price-cutting less
profitable for the first firm, then the strategic conduct may be purposive.67
Or we might ask a firm’s executives why their own firm matches when
rival firms cut prices. If the executives say, for example, “We need to
maintain our policy of always matching rivals’ prices (regardless of whether
it would seem to make business sense)”68 or “We want to send a signal that
65

Id. Maskin and Tirole also show that in a continuous model this behavior is a limiting case
of the outcome of finite-horizon versions of their game, which we can interpret as showing
that the behavior is essentially the result of recursion from Stackelberg-type non-strategic
responses. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly III: Cournot
Competition, 31 EUR. ECON. REV. 947, 958 (1987). Zach Brown and Alexander MacKay
developed another model of non-purposive coordination. They suppose that firms compete
by selecting simple pricing algorithms that are linear in rivals’ prices and that those choices
of algorithms are themselves made non-strategically. The “resulting game resembles
competition with conjectural variations” and leads to coordinated outcomes, with prices that
exceed those generated in static Nash-Bertrand models. Brown & MacKay, supra note 62 at
3 n.5.
66
See supra notes 15 & 17 (describing features of strategic conduct that may suggest it is
purposive). Some forms of conduct may be hard to classify, however. E.g., supra note 15
(providing an example in which price-leadership could be purposive or non-purposive).
67
In terms of Thomas Schelling’s distinction, described supra note 15, communication of
the first expectation (non-purposive conduct) would be a warning while communication of
the second (purposive conduct) would be a threat (at least if the rivals interpreted the
intention to match as a credible commitment).
68
Similarly, if the firm had made a contractual or public commitment to match its rivals’

18

OLIGOPOLY COORDINATION

[19-May-2020

we would like to avoid a price war,” the strategic conduct may be purposive.69
Or if they say, “We see that the overall industry price level has declined, and
will lose many customers unless we reduce price in response” or “We see that
our rivals have reduced their excess production capacity, making it likely that
they will not expand output much when we reduce our output,” the strategic
conduct may be non-purposive.
As previously mentioned, purposive and non-purposive conduct may
coexist, so identifying one type of strategic conduct does not preclude the
possibility that the oligopolists are also engaged in the other. If conduct is
strategic, whether purposive or non-purposive, and, in addition, prices exceed
a coordination-free benchmark level, we would describe the outcome as
coordinated.
C. Summary
Empirical studies, experimental results, real-world examples, and
economic theory consistently indicate that oligopolies can sustain
coordinated outcomes that restrict competition and yield higher prices and
other harms to buyers. While coordination is not ubiquitous in oligopoly
markets, it often arises, it does not require express collusion, and it need not
be perfect (joint profit-maximizing). Oligopolistic coordination—whether
joint profit-maximizing or, more likely, imperfect or incomplete relative to
monopoly outcomes—is a serious problem and thus an appropriate concern
of antitrust enforcement.
II. THE DUBIOUS ARGUMENT FOR SKEPTICISM ABOUT OLIGOPOLY
COORDINATION
In contrast to the above, an influential strand of antitrust thinking
associated with the Chicago school of antitrust views oligopolies benignly.
According to Robert Bork, “[o]ligopolistic structures probably do not lead to
significant restrictions of output,”70 and “non-collusive oligopoly behavior,
to the extent that it exists at all (and I am not persuaded that such behavior
occurs outside of economics textbooks), rarely results in any significant

prices, that may suggest its price-matching conduct is purposive.
69
If a firm systematically responds to the loss of a customer to a specific rival by offering
low prices to the rival’s largest customer (but not offering discounts to other prospective
customers), that behavior too might suggest that strategic conduct is purposive, as it appears
not to make business sense other than through disciplining the rival’s conduct. See supra
notes 15 & 17 (describing features of strategic conduct that may suggest it is purposive).
70
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 196 (1978).
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ability to restrict output.”71 To similar effect, Richard Posner argued that
cartels are “usually quite unstable”72 and that outside of the most
concentrated oligopolies, the “immense practical difficulties” oligopolists
face in reaching cartel prices and the problem of maintaining a cartel “in the
face of the inevitable self-destructive tendencies” cannot be solved without
“the kind of elaborate apparatus of communication and enforcement that is
bound to be detected eventually.”73
According to such Chicagoans, antitrust should have little concern with
oligopoly, outside of prosecuting express agreements to fix prices or divide
markets or challenging mergers to near-monopoly, because oligopolies
usually perform competitively absent express collusion and express collusion
is difficult. This argument relies on three claims, each highly questionable.
The first claim is that absent coordination, oligopolies perform
competitively. Even if “coordination” were interpreted broadly, as we do (but
the Chicagoans may not), this claim ignores the modern economic learning
and antitrust experience with unilateral effects: even absent coordination,74
oligopoly performance is generally quite imperfect and can often become
substantially worse with horizontal mergers well short of monopoly.75

71

Id. at 221. Consistent with this analysis, Bork also contended that horizontal mergers in
oligopoly markets are unlikely to be harmful unless the merger is to monopoly or near
monopoly. Id. Bork used the term “collusive” to refer to express naked horizontal cartels
(price-fixing or market division), id. at 263-79, not to refer to the broader concept of
coordination we employ.
72
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 53 (1st ed. 1976).
73
Id. at 54. As does Bork, Posner supposes that oligopolies either compete or collude (either
expressly or tacitly). Id. at 40, 47. In the second edition of his book, Posner revised his
exposition but continued to question whether oligopolies would succeed in avoiding
competition, particularly in markets with more than a few sellers. RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 68-69 (2d ed. 2001).
74
We are referring to static Nash equilibrium when firms choose price or output. When
oligopolists are behaving non-strategically, their prices could be elevated above their costs.
We treat such prices as our non-coordination benchmark, not as the outcome of coordinated
conduct.
75
The theoretical economic literature that analyzes the Nash equilibria of static models
prominently highlights the Bertrand paradox, by which even as few as two firms will reach
an equilibrium where price is equal to cost. E.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 209-11 (1988). This outcome is the Nash equilibrium of a static oligopoly
model in which homogeneous firms have identical and constant unit costs, and price is the
decision variable. The Bertrand paradox is called a paradox “because it is hard to believe that
firms in industries with few firms never succeed in manipulating the market price to make
profits.” Id. at 210-11. The theoretical literature analyzing the Nash equilibria of static
models also prominently discusses the Cournot model and the Bertrand model with product
differentiation—each of which shows how static oligopoly interaction can elevate price
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The Chicagoans’ second claim is that coordinated outcomes from nonpurposive strategic conduct can simply be ignored.76 When Donald Turner
described oligopoly outcomes, he had non-purposive conduct in mind.77 Yet
Richard Posner, criticizing Turner’s views from a Chicago perspective,
appears to take as given that Turner is describing purposive conduct. 78 This
claim is the likely basis for the Chicagoan understanding of “tacit collusion”
as express collusion demonstrated by circumstantial evidence.79
The third claim is that purposive strategic conduct, including illegal
collusion, is difficult, risky, and unstable—and therefore rare. Proponents of
this view reference genuine challenges in achieving coordinated outcomes
through purposive strategic conduct but overstate how difficult those
challenges are to surmount.
The challenges may include overcoming possible differences in
incentives among oligopolists, short-run incentives to cheat on the
coordinated outcome, difficulties in diagnosing which firm (if any) has done
so, and incentives to shy away from imposing costly punishments. These and
similar factors can indeed limit how widespread and effective purposive
coordination is. But the modern theoretical literature analyzes these
challenges and finds that coordinated outcomes from purposive conduct can
often be achieved and sustained,80 and empirical, real-world, and
experimental evidence demonstrates that coordination is often feasible and
durable.81 Modern economics thus accepts that a broad range of outcomes are
possible in oligopoly markets – prominently including coordinated outcomes.
Overstated obstacles to coordination arising from purposive conduct
include the following:
(1) Explicit communication (talking) is vulnerable to detection and
above cost when a small change in a firm’s decision variable in the direction of increased
competition would not divert all sales to that firm.
76
See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1566-69 (1969) (indicating Posner’s “doubts that the interdependence
theory of oligopoly provides an adequate explanation as to why prices in oligopolistic
industries should exceed competitive levels”).
77
Supra at note 16 and accompanying text.
78
Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562, 1566-69 (1969). Posner acknowledges a collaboration with Aaron Director and
a great debt to George Stigler, both of whom, like Posner, are associated with the Chicago
school. Id. at 1562 n. *.
79
Supra at note 51.
80
Supra at notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
81
See supra Part I.A.
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prosecution by antitrust enforcers.82 Talking may indeed make
coordination easier, but it is not always detectable by enforcers and not
always necessary for oligopolists to reach coordinated outcomes
through purposive conduct. Consensus terms of coordination can be
reached without communication when there are other ways to make an
outcome focal, as through leader-follower conduct or market
allocation based, e.g., on historical patterns.
(2) Oligopolists’ divergent interests make it hard for them to reach
consensus terms, especially without talking. Divergent interests can
indeed pose a challenge for oligopolists seeking to reach terms of
coordination, especially when the number of firms rises and firms
compete on multiple dimensions.83 But there is no reason to think that
this challenge is routinely or reliably prohibitive. For example,
oligopolists can simplify coordination tasks, as by standardizing
product dimensions or grandfathering in prior price differentials; or,
they may instead attempt to minimize competition through means such
as market division or reciprocal royalties rather than price-fixing.84
(3) Successful coordination may require oligopolists to reach consensus
on the terms and enforcement of planned punishment strategies, as
well as reaching consensus on the intended high prices and individual
firm outputs. If oligopolists adopted the complex “optimal punishment
schemes” identified in the theoretical economics literature, they would
indeed often need to engage in such negotiations. But coordination can
often be sustained with simple threats or punishment schemes,
including simply jeopardizing the profitable coordination, that can be
identified without detailed (or perhaps any) communication.85
82

See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
Gavil et al., supra note 28, at 296-97.
84
Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
85
The early experimental literature on cooperation in repeated prisoners’ dilemmas found
that strategies that combined being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear had particular
success in eliciting long-term cooperation. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 54 (1984). The most notable example was the simple “tit for tat” algorithm,
which cooperates on the first move and practices reciprocity for both cooperation and
defection thereafter. Id. at 118. Cf. WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 106-118
(1992) (describing an early experiment in which two economists playing a repeated
prisoners’ dilemma game induced trust and achieved some cooperation). Moreover, the early
game theoretic literature on collusion found that fear of reversion to static Nash behavior—
a natural result of a coordinated consensus breaking down—is often sufficient to deter
cheating. Indeed, antitrust practitioners often center their analyses on that possibility rather
than on more sophisticated punishment schemes. Joseph Harrington has observed that
“cartels occur most frequently in markets for which buyers' decisions are heavily based on
83
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(4) Even after reaching consensus, firms are likely to cheat on it,
especially when firms can find ways to do so that delay or avoid
detection. Proponents of this view rely on George Stigler’s observation
that even firms with few rivals could have strong incentives to
undercut collusive prices, leading to competitive outcomes.86 Shortterm incentives to cheat on the consensus do indeed create a constraint
or challenge for collusion, but this challenge can be overcome—as is
evident from the prevalence and durability of cartels, the theoretical
economic literature showing that collusion can persist even with
dozens or hundreds of rivals and even with severe difficulties in
identifying defection and defectors, and the theoretical and empirical
studies showing how firms can achieve coordinated outcomes through
purposive conduct in the face of uncertainty about rival behavior or
difficulty monitoring that behavior on all competitive dimensions.87
Firms may also be able to improve detection and responses to cheating
through openly adopted practices like product standardization, posting
prices, or contractual commitments to match rivals’ prices.88
Despite its reliance on these questionable premises, the Chicagoan benign
view of oligopolies has circumscribed the range of antitrust enforcement. It
has led the enforcement agencies (whether based on their own judgment or
price.” Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Thoughts on Why Certain Markets are More Susceptible
to Collusion and Some Policy Suggestions for Dealing with Them ¶ 19 (OECD
DAF/COMP/GF(2015)8, 6). If static Nash behavior in such markets is very competitive, as
simple oligopoly models with prices as decision variables suggest, then reversion to static
Nash behavior could support substantial price elevation in a supergame model, because in
those models the degree of cooperation is limited by the strength of the incentive to avoid
breakdown of cooperation. By contrast, the complex “optimal punishment schemes” that
game theorists have analyzed would likely require communication to implement. On the
design of optimal punishment schemes, see generally Dilip Abreu, On the Theory of Infinitely
Repeated Games with Discounting, 56 ECONOMETRICA 383 (1988) (presenting a systematic
framework for studying infinitely repeated games with discounting).
86
George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 46 (1964) (highlighting
oligopolists’ incentive to cheat on a collusive outcome through secret price-cutting, while
recognizing that under some circumstances, coordination could succeed). Richard Posner
explicitly acknowledged the influence of Stigler’s model on his views. Posner, supra note
72, at 47.
87
Supra notes 37-43, 49-50 and accompanying text.
88
Supra note 37 and accompanying text. To similar effect, when distributors or buyers of
intermediate goods from multiple sources tell suppliers about discounts received from rival
suppliers—which is often a natural negotiating tactic—they can facilitate (purposive)
supplier coordination by speeding the detection and response to cheating. More generally,
firms can deter cheating, thereby facilitating coordination, by increasing the transparency of
what otherwise might be secret transactions.
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on their expectations of courts’ beliefs) to relax (i.e., increase over time) the
concentration threshold above which horizontal mergers would be closely
scrutinized and/or likely challenged.89
The Chicago perspective also led the Supreme Court in Brooke Group to
take the view that oligopoly coordination is hard to achieve and unstable.90
The Court explained, seeming to focus on purposive but not explicit
coordination, that the “anticompetitive minuet” of raising prices through
signaling “is most difficult to compose and to perform, even for a disciplined
oligopoly” because signals “are a blunt and imprecise means of ensuring
smooth cooperation, especially in the context of changing or unprecedented
market circumstances.”91 In addition, according to the Court, there is a “high
likelihood that any attempt to discipline will produce an outbreak of
competition.”92 Moreover, the details of the Supreme Court’s explanation of
why the industry was not congenial to coordination “had a distinctly Chicago
flavor” not informed by insights from modern oligopoly theory. 93 While
modern courts accept the possibility of oligopolistic coordination, and are
willing to find competitive harm from conduct in highly concentrated

The threshold above which acquisitions would be scrutinized strictly “involved a reduction
in the number of significant competitors in the following manner: 1960s (12 to 11), 1970s (9
to 8), 1980s (6 to 5), 1990s (4 to 3), 2000s (4 to 3).” William E. Kovacic, Assessing the
Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L 129, 143 (2009). Data released by the Federal Trade Commission about the
disposition of horizontal merger investigations subject to “second requests” between 1996
and 2011 suggest that the likelihood of a challenge rises as (the Commission’s view of) the
number of significant rivals falls, and that a challenge becomes more likely than not when
the acquisition reduces the number of significant rivals from 5 to 4. Federal Trade
Commission, Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, Fiscal Years 1996–2011 tbl. 4.1 (Jan.
2013). The likelihood of FTC enforcement when concentration is below this threshold has
declined over time. JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES 24-33
(2015). The Justice Department likely behaves similarly to the FTC, but the former has not
released comparable data.
90
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227-28
(1993); see id. at 240. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court was wrong to suppose
that the plaintiff “had the burden of proving either the actuality of supracompetitive pricing,
or the actuality of tacit collusion.” Id. at 258.
91
509 U.S. at 228. The Court distinguished this conduct from “express coordination.” Id. at
227. Justice Stevens responded by taking a broader view of coordination, more consistent
with ours. Id. at 257 (“I would suppose . . . that the professional performers who had danced
the minuet for 40 to 50 years would be better able to predict whether their favorite partners
would follow them in the future than would an outsider, who might not know the difference
between Haydn and Mozart.”).
92
509 U.S. at 210.
93
Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 600 (1994).
89
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markets,94 they may nevertheless be led by Brooke Group to interpret the
evidence against the background of the Chicagoan presumption that
oligopolies would be expected to compete strongly.95
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST MERGER ENFORCEMENT
Notwithstanding the important prophylactic role of merger enforcement,
in preventing coordinated effects that would be difficult to challenge under
the antitrust laws after the fact, and notwithstanding developments in
economic thinking that we have highlighted, coordination has received less
attention in antitrust since the 1980s outside of cartel enforcement. 96 This is
evident in the way courts review mergers between rival hospitals. In an
influential 1986 opinion upholding an FTC decision blocking a hospital
94

See, e.g., FTC v. CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (enjoining a merger
reducing the number of major firms three to two on a coordinated-effects theory); United
States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (same). See In re Text
Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 782 F.3d at 873-74 (accepting that the oligopolists
coordinated through leader-follower pricing but declining to infer an agreement among them
in violation of the Sherman Act from circumstantial evidence).
95
While the Court’s skepticism about the success of coordination in Brooke Group was
offered as a reason not to expect oligopoly recoupment after predatory pricing, it has been
understood more broadly. For example, the dissenting judges in the closely divided circuit
court in Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc),
relied in part on Brooke Group when explaining that higher than competitive prices were
implausible in an oligopoly absent an express agreement among rivals because coordination
is difficult to achieve and sustain. Id. at 1041-42.
96
Although it is not the focus of our analysis, we note that the courts have also made it more
difficult to use Section 1 of the Sherman Act to challenge coordinated oligopoly outcomes.
In 1986, the Supreme Court encouraged lower courts to consider the economic plausibility
of allegations of conspiracy before inferring a horizontal agreement from circumstantial
evidence and reject cases where the plaintiff cannot proffer evidence that “tends to exclude
the possibility” of unilateral conduct. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587-88, 596, 597-98 (1986). Although the alleged agreement involved a conspiracy
to set prices below cost, a number of lower courts have applied Matsushita’s standards in
cases involving alleged agreements to raise price. Gavil et al., supra note 28, at 338.
Matsushita’s call for an assessment of the economic plausibility of plaintiff’s conspiracy
evidence at the summary judgment stage of litigation has since been extended to the pleading
stage of litigation. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Since Matsushita,
courts have commonly considered economic plausibility when deciding whether to infer an
agreement from circumstantial evidence. E.g., Stanislaus Food Products Co. v. USS-POSCO
Industries, 803 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2015); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d
1028 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). With courts willing to accept dubious Chicagoan arguments
skeptical that oligopolies can successfully reach coordinated outcomes, this seemingly
neutral economic approach has in practice empowered defendants opposing meritorious
coordination cases by giving them an opportunity they did not previously possess to press
the arguments that persuaded the Chicagoans that coordinated oligopoly outcomes are hard
to reach and sustain.
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merger, Judge Richard Posner explained that the “ultimate issue” in a
horizontal merger case is “whether the challenged acquisition is likely to
facilitate collusion.”97 By contrast, in recent hospital merger cases, the
primary if not sole competitive effects concern was with unilateral effects.98
Coordinated effects of horizontal mergers have also been downplayed by
the antitrust enforcement agencies. The agencies often focus on unilateral
effects even in industries, such as airlines, with histories of coordinated
outcomes.99 We follow the widespread convention of classifying as a
unilateral effect the possibility that all firms’ prices change—provided that
none of the changes turns on the expected responses of rivals.100
But the merger guidelines have evolved to reflect the changing economic
understanding of coordination since the courts and enforcement agencies
adopted Chicago school views. The 1982 Merger Guidelines were predicated
on a Chicagoan view of oligopolistic coordination.101 By contrast, the
97

Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1386 (Posner, J.).
E.g., ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); Saint Alphonsus
Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke's Health System, Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015);
FTC v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center, 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016).
99
Baker, supra note 6, at 116-17. In part, this likely reflects a shift in agency focus to
unilateral effects. Unilateral effects became attractive in part because they gave the
enforcement agencies a greater ability to understand and explain the mechanism by which
competition would be harmed and because economists developed new empirical tools for
analyzing unilateral effects that took advantage of new sources of data. Jonathan B. Baker,
Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects? 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 31
(2003).
100
To address an often-confusing technical question, unilateral price increases can include
non-strategic responses of non-merging rivals (such as price increases). In some common
models used to simulate unilateral effects, notably static Nash equilibrium models where
firms choose price or output, firms act as though they anticipate that rivals will not respond
to their decisions but will react rationally to the fact of the merger, so non-merging firms’
choices typically will change. We treat those effects of a merger in such Nash equilibrium
models as our non-coordinated benchmark, and would classify those responses as unilateral,
not coordinated. Unilateral effects do not assume that non-merging firms’ prices (or outputs)
remain constant, but they do assume that those firms pursue “unchanging strategies,”
meaning roughly that each non-merging firm’s price bears the same relationship to others’
(including the merging firms’) prices as it would have done absent the merger. See Gregory
J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in
HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 43, 43 (Paolo Buccirossi, ed. 2008) (suggesting that
merger effects are “coordinated” only if they shift the (confusingly named) “reaction
functions” of non-merging parties, and using the language of “unilateral effects” to describe
the outcome when non-merging rivals respond to an anticipated price increase by the merged
firm by raising price too, so long as the non-merging firms pursue “unchanging strategies.”).
101
Paul T. Denis, Market Power in Antitrust Merger Analysis: Refining the Collusion
Hypothesis, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 829, 829-30 (1992); cf. William F. Baxter, Responding to the
Reaction: The Draftsman’s View, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 618, 626 (1983) (acknowledging the
98
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analytical framework governing coordinated effects set forth in the 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines was rooted in the modern economics of
coordination through purposive conduct102 and the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines broadened the definition of coordinated effects further to
incorporate non-purposive strategic (“parallel accommodating”) conduct.103
How should antitrust enforcers and courts address coordination when
evaluating horizontal mergers in light of the modern economic literature?
Here, we suggest that when conducting a detailed competitive effects
analysis, the analysis should turn on whether the coordinated effects concern
principally involves purposive or non-purposive strategic conduct. Enforcers
should, of course, be open to both concerns, which are not mutually
exclusive.104
We emphasize, however, that both types of strategic conduct and
resulting coordinated effects can be expected to be more likely or more
substantial the greater the level and increase in market concentration. This
supports a structural merger policy, by which market concentration statistics
trigger a presumption of coordinated effects—while also suggesting more
detailed ways of evaluating the likelihood of coordinated effects in the event
the plaintiff’s prima facie case based on concentration is not strong or
influence of Stigler’s analysis of oligopolies in the development of concentration standards).
102
1992 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 § 2.1. More specifically, the discussion of
coordinated effects in the 1992 Guidelines was based on the idea that coordinated outcomes
were those subgame perfect equilibria of infinitely repeated games that are less competitive
than static oligopoly outcomes. See Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial
Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY – MICROECONOMICS 281, 291-92 (1991); Baker, supra note 7, at 152 n.16. These
articles were written around the time that those authors worked on drafting the 1992
Guidelines.
103
2010 HMG § 7, supra note 13 (identifying as “coordinated” effects conduct that is
profitable only because of rival reactions, as in the 1992 Guidelines, while explicitly
incorporating “parallel accommodating conduct” within that definition and distinguishing it
from a “common understanding that is not explicitly negotiated but would be enforced by
the detection and punishment of deviations that would undermine the coordinated
interaction”). See Carl Shapiro, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Update from the Antitrust Division, 27-28 (Nov. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/264295.pdf (explaining that the 2010 merger
guidelines recognize parallel accommodating conduct as a form of coordination and
providing an example).
104
Supra note 18. For example, if pre-merger firms have reached coordinated outcomes
short of joint profit-maximization through non-purposive conduct, their merger could
potentially facilitate purposive coordination (as well as make non-purposive coordination
more effective).
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successfully questioned by the merging firm defendants.105
A. Coordinated Effects Involving Purposive Strategic Conduct
In considering whether a merger would facilitate more effective
purposive strategic conduct, we recommend that enforcers and courts look to
identify mergers that weaken a constraint on the ability of coordinating firms
to approach more closely the joint profit-maximizing outcome or make
coordination more likely or more stable. This approach is suggested by
economic models in which firms seek to approach that outcome (or another
anticompetitive outcome) but are constrained in that attempt because they
must reach consensus terms of coordination and deter cheating. 106 In such
models, coordination is constrained either by limitations on the incentive of
coordinating firms to punish cheating or by the difficulties they face in
identifying coordinated outcomes that would increase the pool of profits from
exercising market power without reducing the profits obtained by any one of
those firms. This approach allows the plaintiff to explain, and the court to
understand, why the merger matters—and not simply look to the structural
presumption that associates higher concentration with greater odds of
successful purposive coordination.
Suppose, for example, that all firms sell a single product so
interchangeable that one way or another all will charge the identical price.
Thus, in practice, coordinating firms can improve the terms of coordination
only by raising that price.107 All the firms would like the industry price to rise
to some extent, but the high-price point that a firm would select—the highest
the firm would want the uniform price to go before it would do better by
105

Once the plaintiff has satisfied its initial burden of production in a horizontal merger case,
the strength of defendants’ practical burden of persuasion varies on a sliding scale. “The
more compelling the prima facie case,” which could be satisfied by relying on a presumption
of competitive harm inferred from market concentration, “the more evidence the defendant
must present to rebut it successfully.” United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F. 2d 981,
991 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Accord, FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 726 (2001). One district
court has interpreted this language to mean that as the plaintiff’s prima facie case becomes
more compelling, the defendant must show more to meet its burden of production (not just
that the defendant must show more to meet its practical burden of persuasion). United States
v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 77 (D.D.C. 2011).
106
More technically, we are working within the economic framework of oligopoly
repeated games as it is usually interpreted in antitrust economics, although in pure game
theory there is no assumption that players seek any particular outcome.
107
This simplifying assumption, made for expositional convenience, rules out the possibility
that the firms would, for example, choose different prices for different firms, or pay high
cost firms to reduce output more than low cost firms. Nothing of consequence in the example
would change if prices differed across firms, perhaps reflecting differences in product
quality, and the firms preserved those price differences when increasing their prices.
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cheating rather than going along with its rivals—would differ from firm to
firm. A firm with a small market share and a greater ability to expand output
inexpensively might prefer to cheat rather than accept the higher industry
price that a firm with a high share and a high cost of expanding output would
prefer the industry to adopt.
In equilibrium, the coordinated price would be the lowest of those highprice points: the lowest price that any individual firm would accept if it knew
that its rivals would charge the identical price. The constraint on coordination
would be the incentive of the firm M (for “maverick”) that prefers the lowest
coordinated industry price not to raise the industry price further. If following
a merger between firm M and a rival the merged firm prefers a higher price
than did pre-merger firm M, that will relax the constraint on coordination
previously imposed by firm M, leading prices to rise.
In consequence, courts and enforcers should be concerned particularly
about the coordination-enhancing potential of mergers that involve a
maverick in an industry where coordination through purposive conduct is
ongoing or appears feasible.108 Although the term “maverick” has been used
loosely, confusing the district court in H&R Block,109 we refer to a setting in
which firms would cheat by cutting the coordinated price. In this setting, a
maverick is a firm that is most apt to be the binding constraint on
coordination, as by being nearly indifferent between going along with a high
coordinated price and cheating on that price.110 In the above example, the
maverick is the firm that prefers the lowest coordinated price and will keep
the coordinated price from increasing further simply by refusing to go along.
As the example suggests, a merger involving a maverick may relax the
maverick’s constraint on the effectiveness of industry coordination, leading

108

See generally, Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving
Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135 (2002)
(explaining how coordinated competitive effects analysis can be reconstructed around the
role of a maverick firm that constrains prices when industry coordination is incomplete). For
enforcement examples see, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBEV SA /
NV, No.1:13-cv-00127 (D.D.C. January 31, 2013); FCC Staﬀ Analysis and Findings, In re
Applications of AT&T, Inc. & Deutsche Telekom AG, WT Docket No. 11–65 (November
29, 2011).
109
United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F.3d 36, 79-80 (D.D.C. 2011). The court rejected
the term as confusing but nevertheless found anticompetitive coordinated effects on the
ground that the merger involved the acquisition of a firm that played the role of a maverick
by our definition.
110
It is also possible that firms would deviate by declining to punish cheating rivals (cheating
on the “punishment state”). Then a maverick would be nearly indifferent to participating in
the punishment of cheaters.
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to higher prices.
A maverick, according to our definition, can be identified in a number of
ways.111 For example, a firm is likely to be considered a maverick if it has
actually declined to go along with recent attempts by others to raise the
coordinated price.112 If other firms foresee such behavior, they may avoid
attempts to raise the price.113. A maverick may be identified by structural
features that make it less willing than its rivals to go along with more
ambitious coordination, such as a small share and substantial ability to
expand output inexpensively.114 A maverick could also be identified when
industry prices respond to factors that affect its own marginal costs but not
the costs of its rivals.115 Different firms can be mavericks at different times
or on different competitive dimensions.116
The potential for a merger involving a maverick to enhance oligopoly
coordination links growing concentration from the reduction in the number
of significant rivals with competitive harm. The odds that a randomly selected
merger among market participants involves a maverick increase as the
number of significant rivals falls—and even that calculation would understate
the likelihood given the incentive of firms to make acquisitions that facilitate
coordination.117 This link supports a structural presumption of coordinated
111

Others employ the term maverick more broadly to also include a firm that competes more
aggressively than its rivals, including when oligopolists are not coordinating through
repeated interaction. See, e.g., John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Private Profitability of Horizontal
Mergers with Non-Cournot and Maverick Behavior, 7 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 403, 410 (1989)
(describing maverick firms as those firms “with a particularly small conjectural variation,
causing output expansiveness in its industry” or a firm “whose demise results in an increase
in the remaining firms’ conjectural variations”) (emphasis omitted).
112
See Baker, supra note 93, at 174.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 175–76.
115
Baker, supra note 108, at 174-75 (describing how the market price will change if a
maverick firm’s marginal costs rise or fall).
116
When challenging the US Airways/American merger, the government alleged that the
merger would enhance coordination on two diﬀerent dimensions: with US Airways a
maverick on one dimension (involving discounted connecting fares) and American a
maverick on the other (involving aggregate capacity). Amended Complaint, United States v.
U.S. Airways Group, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-01236-CKK, ¶ 46, 48-50, 68-70 (D.D.C. September
5, 2013) (describing US Airways as offering connecting service at a substantial discount to
the nonstop service of other airlines on the same routes, while other airlines generally do not
undercut the nonstop fares of their rivals, and describing American’s standalone expansion
plan as undermining the industry’s capacity discipline).
117
See Baker, supra note 108, at 198-99 (“[T]he fewer the number of significant sellers, the
more likely it is that the loss of any one would be the loss of a firm that constrains coordinated
conduct.”).
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harm from horizontal mergers when strategic conduct is purposive.118
B. Coordinated Effects Involving Non-Purposive Strategic Conduct
A merger could also create coordinated effects, and therefore harm
competition, by affecting non-purposive strategic conduct. If, as a result of a
merger, oligopolists engaging in non-purposive strategic conduct change
their expectations of the way their rivals will naturally or predictably respond
in the competitive and market environment, the coordinated outcome can
change. Coordinated effects arise when the new coordinated outcome is
worse for buyers.
In order to explain how a merger can create coordinated effects when
strategic conduct is non-purposive, we distinguish two ways that rivals may
naturally respond, which we term reinforcing and diluting. We say that rivals’
reactions in the industry are “reinforcing” when they go in the same direction
(e.g., rivals’ reactions to a price cut generally involve price cuts) and
“diluting” when they go in opposite directions (e.g., rivals’ reactions to a
capacity increase generally involve capacity reductions). 119 As our
hypothetical examples will demonstrate, a merger will create an adverse
coordinated effect when strategic conduct is non-purposive and the merger
would be expected to strengthen reinforcing reactions or weaken diluting
reactions. The examples suggest market features that courts and enforcers
could look for to identify mergers with coordination-enhancing potential. But
the analysis of coordinated effects of mergers involving non-purposive
strategic conduct is in its infancy, and we expect that more such possibilities
will become evident over time.
1. Reinforcing reactions
When the relevant reactions are reinforcing, competitive harm would be
expected if the merger strengthens those reactions by making them sharper,
118

While we have emphasized the way increased concentration or the loss of a maverick
from merger enhance the prospects for purposive coordination, they are not the only way
mergers can make purposive coordination more likely or more effective. Mergers may also
do so by making it easier to identify terms of coordination or increasing the speed or extent
of punishments for cheating, for example by increasing the transparency of prices or
increasing symmetry among firms. Supra notes 35, 88 and accompanying text. Factors such
as these may facilitate the exercise of purposive coordination even when firms were
coordinating non-purposively before the merger. Supra note 104.
119
In the discussion here, we assume (as is the case when prices or capacities
are decision variables) that an increase by one firm either benefits consumers and harms
rivals or vice versa. If we allowed for a decision variable that has same-sign effects on
consumers and rivals, our discussion would become more cumbersome.
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more prompt, or more likely. Suppose that price reactions are reinforcing: A
firm contemplating a price cut expects its rivals to cut their prices in response
and a firm contemplating a price increase expects its rivals to respond by
raising their prices. It is plausible that the expectation of reinforcing reactions
will discourage the firm from reducing prices and encourage it to increase
prices. A merger that makes those reactions stronger or more certain will tend
to harm buyers. as such a merger will more strongly discourage price
reductions and more strongly encourage price increases.
We think it is often plausible that a horizontal merger will strengthen
reinforcing non-purposive reactions. The merged firm is necessarily a larger
part of its rivals’ competitive environment than were the merging parties
before the merger. In an industry with four comparably significant firms, for
example, any one firm might cut its price with the expectation that, for each
of the other three, the competitive environment would remain predominantly
as it was before the price cut, limiting those rivals’ natural and predictable
reinforcing responses. That expectation could change with a merger,
strengthening their responses and thereby leading to a higher coordinated
price.
To illustrate the way reinforcing reactions can strengthen as the number
of firms shrink, suppose that in this industry, firms respond to price changes
by rivals with a lag, and that when a responding firm adjusts its price, it
matches an average of all other firms’ prices.120 Then, in a four-firm industry,
if one firm lowers its price, it will take several time lags before the other
firms’ prices come into near parity with the first mover’s. Meanwhile, the
price cutter will be attracting more customers, who may remain its customers
when price parity is (approximately) restored. Under such circumstances, the
first firm’s price reduction could be profitable. By contrast, if the industry
shrinks to two firms, and the duopolists employ the same behavioral rule, a
price cut by one firm would promptly lead its rival to match in full, likely
making price-cutting unprofitable.
The basic insight from the example does not rely on its specific behavioral
pattern. The example shows, based on intuitively plausible mechanics, that a
firm in an industry with a somewhat competitive market structure may expect
its price movements to be only partially matched or matched only with a lag,
while a firm in a more concentrated industry may expect such matching to be
prompter and fuller. The faster and stronger reactions in the more
concentrated industry would be expected to discourage price-cutting and
120

See Brown & MacKay, supra note 62 at 1 n.3 (indicating that in practice, pricing
algorithms typically adjust prices based on the average price of a set of competitors).
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encourage price increases.121
This example illustrates how a merger that increases concentration
significantly when reactions are reinforcing can lead sellers to hold back from
procompetitive actions for non-purposive strategic reasons—more precisely,
to hold back more than they did before—thereby harming buyers. As the
2010 Merger Guidelines state:
A market typically is more vulnerable to coordinated conduct
if a firm’s prospective competitive reward from attracting
customers away from its rivals will be significantly
diminished by likely responses of those rivals. This is more
likely to be the case, the stronger and faster are the responses
the firm anticipates from its rivals. The firm is more likely to
anticipate strong responses if there are few significant
competitors . . . .122
The insight from the example links expected responses to the level of market
concentration. It thus supports a structural presumption of harm from
horizontal merger when strategic conduct is non-purposive and reactions are
reinforcing.
2. Diluting reactions
In other industries—for example, ones in which firms compete primarily
by setting output levels or choosing capacities—it may be reasonable to
expect diluting reactions, not reinforcing ones.123 Firms contemplating
reducing output or capacity may be more likely to expect rivals to expand
output or capacity in response rather than to pull back, and firms increasing
capacity may be more likely to expect rivals to postpone their own capacity
increases.
In such an industry, harm may arise if a merger weakens the firms’
diluting responses. This might happen for at least two reasons. First, the
merged firm faces fewer rivals, with less total capacity, than did either pre121

If responses are also more certain in the more concentrated industry, that feature, too,
would be expected to discourage price-cutting and encourage price increases.
122
2010 HMG § 7.2, supra note 13.
123
When the reactions in question tend to dilute the initial competitive impact of a change,
those reactions will often make the industry more competitive than a static Nash analysis
would predict. A merger that weakens such reactions will harm competition even if the postmerger industry remains more competitive than a static Nash analysis (given the post-merger
market structure) suggests.
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merger partner. Therefore, when deciding whether to cut back its output, the
firm may expect a more muted output expansion by rivals than before.
Second, ordinary unilateral effects will often reduce the merged firm’s profitmaximizing output. If that shift also reduces the firm’s profit-maximizing
change in output in response to a non-merging firm’s output reduction
(relative to the aggregate response of the merging firms prior to the merger),
the non-merging firms will anticipate a weaker diluting response to their own
output changes and will thus be encouraged to reduce their output.
For example, consider a merger in an industry with a relatively
homogenous product, where the firms have fixed capacities and rising
marginal costs of production. The merger of two fairly large rivals would be
expected to create a firm that has a unilateral incentive to reduce output in
order to increase the industry price. One reason is that the merged firm would
have a greater base of sales on which to profit from a higher industry price.
A second reason is that the merged firm would recognize that less industry
capacity is in the hands of other firms. The acquired firm’s capacity would
no longer be used to expand output in response to an output reduction by the
merged firm. Thus, the merged firm would expect the magnitude of the
aggregate supply response it would face if it were to raise prices would be
reduced (relative to the supply response the merger partners previously
faced). Moreover, that reaction is natural and predictable, so non-merging
rivals would understand that the merged firm’s incentives have changed.
Each non-merging firm would assume that the merged firm would not expand
output much, if at all, in the event the non-merging firm reduces output,
giving each an incentive to raise price.124 The upshot is that after the merger,
all firms would have a greater incentive than before to reduce output and
increase prices, making competitive harm from merger likely.125
The example illustrates how a horizontal merger that increases
concentration substantially when reactions are diluting can weaken those
reactions and thus make firms more willing to accommodate price increases.
Under such circumstances, the firms would be expected to increase prices.
124

In terms of the decomposition proposed by Landes and Posner, the merger in the above
example increases the merged firm’s market power by reducing the elasticity of non-merging
rival supply. Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937, 945 (1980) (explaining that the higher the elasticity of rival supply, the
less a firm’s market power).
125
See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 1:12–cv–
00227 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f280100/280135.pdf
(arguing that the merger would result in a loss of competition and thus result in higher prices
and lower output in the United States by leading the merged firm to reduce output
strategically and leading non-merging rivals to respond by increasing prices).
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The example also links a weakening of expected supply responses, and
greater risk of competitive harm, to an increased level of market
concentration—thereby supporting a structural presumption of harm from
horizontal mergers when strategic conduct is non-purposive and reactions are
diluting.
3. Concluding Comments on the Coordinated Effects of Mergers
Just as a horizontal merger could simultaneously create unilateral and
coordinated competitive effects,126 a horizontal merger could simultaneously
create coordinated competitive effects through its effect on both purposive
and non-purposive conduct. In addition to the familiar effects on purposive
coordination, industry firms could be led to act less aggressively by
strengthening reinforcing non-purposive reactions or weakening diluting
non-purposive reactions. In other cases, though, one coordination theory will
be more plausible than the other or a merger may have opposing effects on
the prospects for coordination through the two types of conduct.127
Our analysis of mergers shows that regardless of whether coordinated
outcomes arise from purposive or non-purposive strategic conduct,
coordination will often become more likely or more effective as the number
of firms in an industry shrinks. A merger is more likely to involve a maverick,
and thereby enhance coordination, as the number of significant rivals falls.128
Similarly, as concentration grows, firms will react differently to a larger
merged firm’s strategic moves than they previously did to smaller rivals’
moves—potentially enhancing coordination by strengthening reinforcing
non-purposive strategic conduct and weakening diluting non-purposive
strategic conduct.129 Accordingly, a structural presumption makes sense with
respect to both ways of thinking about strategic conduct and coordinated
outcomes.
In our view, the plausibility of persistent coordinated conduct in
oligopoly markets combined with the limitations in the precision of our
126

E.g., Miller, Sheu & Weinberg, supra note 5 at 29 (identifying both unilateral and
coordinated competitive effects of a horizontal merger through a simulation model).
127
For example, if a merger leads to less competitive reactions, thus enhancing nonpurposive coordination, and if the most plausible punishment strategies for purposive
coordination involve reversion to the one-shot interaction, the merger could simultaneously
reduce the prospects for purposive coordination by making punishment less severe. To
similar effect, if the merger makes prices more transparent, the merger can facilitate
purposive coordination, supra note 118, and it may strengthen reinforcing non-purposive
conduct.
128
Supra note 106 and accompanying text.
129
Supra Section III.B.
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predictive tools strengthens the case for a structural merger policy, by which
coordinated effects are presumed when a horizontal merger increases
concentration significantly in a concentrated market. Since the structural
presumption was introduced in the 1960s,130 its strength has eroded, in part
due to Chicago school skepticism about the likelihood and sustainability of
oligopolistic coordination.131 As courts come to recognize that coordination
is a substantially greater concern in modern economics than it appeared to
Chicago-oriented commentators and courts, they can be expected to
strengthen the presumption by requiring stronger rebuttal evidence for any
given concentration level and increase.132
CONCLUSION
Coordinated oligopoly outcomes arise when firm conduct is substantially
influenced by the prospect of rivals’ reactions. Reactions can be purposive,
designed to punish cheating from consensus terms of coordination, but they
need not be. They can also be non-purposive: natural and predictable
responses to the change in a firm’s competitive environment when one of its
rivals makes a competitive move such as a price change. We do not suppose
that either purposive or non-purposive coordination is inevitable in oligopoly
markets, nor that it invariably raises price substantially above the nonstrategic benchmark. But, as we have demonstrated, coordinated oligopoly
outcomes are common and harmful.
While we have stressed the broad scope of strategic conduct and
coordinated outcomes, we have also explained that even narrowly defined
“coordination” is not as difficult and unlikely as Chicago-oriented courts and
commentators suppose. Criminal convictions for illegal collusion are surely
the tip of that iceberg, and are themselves not rare.
In short, coordination is a serious concern in oligopoly, underrated by the
United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (indicating that a
merger which produces a firm controlling a high market share and results in a significant
increase in market concentration is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially
that it must be enjoined absent evidence clearly showing otherwise).
131
Baker, supra note 7, at 77-80. The nadir was the influential Baker Hughes decision of the
D.C. Circuit, handed down in 1990, which described concentration as simply “a convenient
starting point” for a “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis, United States v. Baker Hughes,
Inc., 908 F. 2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and explicitly disclaimed a requirement that
defendants make a “clear showing” to rebut the inference of competitive harm. Id. at 992.
132
For a complementary analysis and a discussion of legislative options for strengthening
the structural presumption, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers,
Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1742 (2018). See also Baker, supra
note 6, at 77-79 (justifying the structural presumption based on an error-cost analysis).
130
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Chicagoans and those influenced by their skepticism. Particularly when
Sherman Act enforcement against coordination would be weak or
inappropriate, but not only then, merger policy should be alert to the risks of
coordinated effects, broadly construed, and rely on a strengthened structural
presumption in horizontal merger analysis to help control those risks.

